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TECHNOLOGICAL TYING OF 










Technology vendors are producing products and services which, by design, use 
technological methods to restrict interoperability and tie the use of their products and 
services to the use of other products and services from the same vendor.  Often this type 
of technological tying raises concerns that it is anti-competitive.  One such example is 
the technological tying of the Apple iPod to music purchased from the Apple iTunes 
Music Store, and vice versa.  The new Apple iPhone contains technological locks which 
tie the iPhone to the mobile telephony services of a particular third-party mobile 
carrier, a new development in technological tying, and much more likely to be unlawful 
in Australia.  The purpose of this article is to examine whether the Trade Practices Act 
1974 (Cth), in its current form is adequate to deal with this type of technological tying. 
 
I INTRODUCTION - DIGITAL RIGHTS MANAGEMENT AND TECHNOLOGICAL TYING 
 
Increasingly, products and services are being bundled together in the computer, media, 
entertainment, and telecommunications sectors.  Such bundling may be economically 
efficient and pro-competitive if it is the result of economies of scope which give rise to 
cost savings.  Consumers benefit if the integrated product is supplied to them at lower 
prices.  On the other hand, such bundling may be the result of a misuse of market 
power.  A supplier with market power in relation to one product or service may force 
consumers to take a second product or service which consumers do not want, or can 
obtain more cheaply, from another supplier.  If so, consumers are harmed and more 
efficient suppliers are foreclosed.1  
 
In the past, suppliers have given effect to such anti-competitive conduct by way of 
conditions in contracts or licence agreements.  However, the need to impose such a tie 
by way of contract has been obviated by the increasingly widespread use of methods of 
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technologically tying products together, such as restrictive Digital Rights Management 
(‘DRM’) technology.2
 
DRM systems are not perfect, and most DRM systems have been ‘cracked’ or 
circumvented, often by groups of enterprising amateurs, collaborating over the Internet.  
Manufacturers use their ingenuity to devise better and stronger DRM systems, and 
technology enthusiasts use their ingenuity to devise ways around the DRM, motivated 
by the intellectual challenge, a philosophical objection to DRM, quest for glory and 
bragging rights, or more practical considerations.  Thus far, the manufacturers have lost 
every major battle. 
 
A Apple Inc.’s DRM track record 
 
Apple Inc.’s previous use of DRM in their entertainment-related products and services 
has caused significant controversy.  Apple Inc.’s proprietary DRM system, known as 
FairPlay, is the only DRM system supported by the Apple iPod, and is used to encrypt 
all content (including music, videos, and movies) purchased from the Apple iTunes 
Music Store. 
 
The effect of this is that content which consumers purchase from the iTunes Music 
Store can only be used on hardware and software that support FairPlay DRM.  Because 
Apple Inc. refuses to license FairPlay to other manufacturers, the only devices which 
support FairPlay DRM are produced by Apple Inc. 
 
FairPlay is the only DRM technology that the iPod supports, and as a consequence, 
consumers with iPods cannot purchase content from suppliers other than Apple and use 
it on their iPods.  Those other suppliers of content use different, more openly-licensed 
DRM technologies.  When a competitor of Apple Inc. devised a way to encrypt music in 
a FairPlay-compatible format, and sold music through their own website which could be 
played on Apple Inc. iPods, Apple Inc. threatened to sue, and updated the software in 
iPods to prevent that music from being played on iPods.3
 
Despite the controversy caused by Apple Inc.’s use of FairPlay DRM, until recent times 
their conduct was limited to technologically tying Apple Inc. goods and services to 
other Apple Inc. goods and services, and as we discuss below,4 would only be unlawful 
in Australia if it had the purpose, effect or likely effect of substantially lessened 
competition. 
                                                
2  See generally, D Clapperton and S Corones, ‘Locking in Customers, Locking out Competitors: Anti-
Circumvention Laws in Australia and Their Potential Effect on Competition in High Technology 
Markets’ (2006) 30 Melbourne University Law Review 657. 
3  See generally Wikipedia, FairPlay (2007) 
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/FairPlay#Harmony:_RealPlayer_Music_on_the_iPod> at 17 October 
2007.  For a case study of Apple’s iTunes Music Store of how the doctrines and principles of 
copyright and contract law, DRM systems (including anti-circumvention laws), and online media 
distribution models interact with each other see: iTunes How Copyright, Contract, and Technology 
Shape the Business of Digital Media – A Case Study (The Berkman Centre for Internet & Society, 
Harvard Law School, 15 June 2004). 
4  This conduct would constitute exclusive dealing within the meaning of s 47(2) of the Trade Practices 
Act 1974 (Cth) only if it had the purpose, effect, or likely effect of substantially lessening 
competition.  See below part IIIC2. 
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Apple Inc.’s marketing strategy for the iPhone in some foreign countries steps over a 
significant line – it is no longer forcing the use of their own products and services, it is 
forcing the acquisition of services from entirely unrelated companies.  This conduct 
may be per se unlawful in Australia. 
 
B Tying or locking of mobile phones to specific carriers 
 
The sale of mobile phones which are tied to a particular carrier is long-established in 
Australia.  The justification for this behaviour is that the mobile phones are sold – or 
often supplied ‘free’ – to consumers at less than their actual cost ie the mobile carrier 
subsidises the cost of the phone.  The carrier then recoups this loss over the term of the 
contract with the consumer. 
 
Typically, the mobile phones will be unlocked by the carrier upon request, once the 
initial contract term has expired, or an early termination fee of some description is paid, 
so that the carrier may recoup the subsidy.5
 
Where the carrier has not subsidised the cost of the phone, there seems to be no 
legitimate pro-competitive justification for locking the phone to the services of that 
carrier, especially where that locking is permanent and not just for the duration of the 
initial contract. 
 
II THE APPLE IPHONE 
 
Apple Inc. co-founder and CEO Steve Jobs announced the Apple iPhone at the 
Macworld convention in January 2007,6 describing the iPhone as ‘a revolutionary and 
magical product that is literally five years ahead of any other mobile phone.’7  The 
iPhone was said to combine: 
 
three products – a revolutionary mobile phone, a widescreen iPod with touch controls, 
and a breakthrough Internet communications device with desktop-class email, web 
browsing, searching and maps – into one small and lightweight handheld device.8
 
The iPhone functions as a quad-band9 GSM mobile phone with EDGE support,10 a 2.0 
mega pixel digital camera, a portable media player with iPod-type functionality, which 
allows the playing of music and video (including purchased television content and 
motion pictures), an organiser with PDA-like functionality, and an Internet browser and 
email client with internet connectivity via WiFi (allowing the iPhone to be used on 
                                                
5  Anecdotal evidence suggests that some carriers, such as Hutchison 3G Australia Pty Ltd (3), will 
refuse to unlock some phones under any conditions. 
6  Macworld, Macworld Expo Keynote Live Update (2007) 
<http://www.macworld.com/news/2007/01/09/liveupdate/index.php> at 15 October 2007. 
7  Apple, Apple Reinvents the Phone with iPhone (2007) 
<http://www.apple.com/pr/library/2007/01/09iphone.html> at 15 October 2007. 
8  Ibid. 
9  ‘Quad band’ means a GSM mobile phone which can operate in the 850, 900, 1800, and 1900 MHz 
bands, allowing it to be used in almost any country in the world with a GSM mobile phone network. 
10  ‘EDGE’ is an acronym for ‘Enhanced Data rates for GSM Evolution’, an enhancement to 2G GSM 
networks which allows for higher-speed data transfers for Internet access and other purposes.  
Presently, only the Telstra mobile phone network supports EDGE in Australia. 
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residential or corporate wireless networks) or EDGE (via the mobile telephony 
network). 
 
Apple Inc. announced on the same day that Cingular (a then-subsidiary of AT&T, 
currently branded as AT&T Mobility) had been chosen as ‘Apple’s exclusive US carrier 
partner’ for the iPhone.11  Other exclusive distribution agreements have been announced 
for Germany, France and the United Kingdom.12  However, it appears that Apple will 
not itself sell iPhones to the public in Germany and France, making their carrier partners 
the sole suppliers.13
 
The precise terms of the agreement between Apple and AT&T are not known, but some 
details have been leaked by the press, and the terms of the agreement are alleged to 
include that: 
 
• AT&T would be the exclusive provider for iPhone mobile telephony services in the 
US; 
• the duration of the exclusive agreement was five years; 
• Apple Inc. would receive a proportion of revenues generated by AT&T iPhone 
users;14 
• iPhone users were to be prohibited from using a mobile provider other than AT&T 
by way of technological locks on the iPhone; and 
• Apple Inc. would be restrained for a period of time from developing a version of the 
iPhone which would be compatible with CDMA wireless networks – the network 
technology used by many of AT&T’s largest competitors.15 
 
The back of the retail packaging of the iPhone states: 'Requirements: Minimum new 
two-year wireless service plan with AT&T required to activate all iPhone features, 
including iPod features.'16
 
In smaller print, further down the back of the packaging, it states in part: 'Credit check 
required; must be 18 years or older. Service plan with AT&T required for cellular 
network capabilities on expiration of initial two-year agreement.'17
                                                
11  Apple, above n 7. 
12  Apple, Apple Chooses O2 as Exclusive Carrier for iPhone in UK (2007) 
<http://www.apple.com/pr/library/2007/09/18iphone.html> at 15 October 2007; Apple, Apple 
Chooses Orange as Exclusive Carrier for iPhone in France (2007) 
<http://www.apple.com/pr/library/2007/10/16orange.html> at 17 October 2007; Apple, Apple and T-
Mobile Announce Exclusive Partnership for iPhone in Germany (2007) 
<http://www.apple.com/pr/library/2007/09/19iphone.html> at 15 October 2007. 
13  Apple, Apple Chooses Orange as Exclusive Carrier for iPhone in France, above n 12; Apple, Apple 
and T-Mobile Announce Exclusive Partnership for iPhone in Germany, above n 12; Email from 
Natalie Kerris (Apple press contact) to Dale Clapperton, 17 October 2007. 
14  Richard Wray, Vodafone put off by Apple’s demand for big iPhone slice (2007) The Guardian 
<http://business.guardian.co.uk/story/0,,2119921,00.html> at 15 October 2007. 
15  Hohlman v Apple Inc., No 5:07-cv-05152-RS (ND Cal, filed 5 October 2007) ‘Class action 
complaint for damages, injunctive relief and restitution’ [38]-[44]; Smith v Apple Inc., No 1-07-CV-
095781 (Sup Court of Cal, filed 5 October 2007) ‘Class action complaint for treble damages and 
permanent injunctive relief’ [44]. 
16  Anand Lal Shimpi, Apple iPhone: Unboxed (2007) AnandTech 
<http://www.anandtech.com/gadgets/showdoc.aspx?i=3025> at 15 October 2007. 
17  Ibid. 
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Despite the technological tie to AT&T, the iPhone has been phenomenally successful.  
Launched on 29 June 2007, Apple Inc. reported selling 270 000 iPhones in the first two 
days of its release,18 and sold 1 000 000 iPhones within 74 days.19
 
US financial disclosure rules require Apple to separately account for ‘deferred revenue’ 
to be received from Apple Inc.’s carrier partners.20  This has allowed financial analysts 
to calculate that AT&T pays Apple Inc., on average, US$18 per month per iPhone 
activated on the AT&T network.  Over the two-year contract term, an iPhone user will 
pay more to Apple Inc. in these indirect fees than the purchase price of the phone.21  
Media reports claim that European mobile operators have offered Apple Inc. as much as 
40% of revenues from iPhone users to secure exclusivity.22
 
The cost of these secret commissions to Apple Inc. is, of course, ultimately born by the 
consumer, in the form of more expensive mobile services. 
 
A Technological enforcement of the iPhone-AT&T tie 
 
Although there is no express contractual requirement to enter into a mobile contract 
with AT&T to purchase the iPhone, a newly purchased iPhone is in a disabled or 
‘locked’ state and cannot be used until it is ‘activated’.  All functionality of the iPhone 
is disabled until the phone is activated23 – the iPhone cannot even be used for iPod-type 
functions, such as playing audio files, until activation takes place. 
 
Activation is a technical process, during which the user electronically provides their 
personal details, contact information, credit card details, etc to AT&T and contracts 
with AT&T for a two-year mobile telephone plan.24  Once the new contract with AT&T 
is complete, an electronic signal is sent to the iPhone which ‘activates’ or unlocks it, 
and all functions of the phone are available from that point onwards. 
 
However, even post-activation, the iPhone cannot be used with mobile telephony 
services provided by any carrier other than AT&T.  Inserting a SIM card of another 
mobile carrier will not work, and will display an error message on the iPhone.  This 
means that US-based iPhone users can not use their iPhones with any carrier other than 





                                                
18  Apple, Apple Inc. Q3 2007 Unaudited Summary Data (2007) 
<http://images.apple.com/pr/pdf/q307data_sum.pdf> at 15 October 2007. 
19  Apple, Apple Sells One Millionth iPhone (2007) 
<http://www.apple.com/pr/library/2007/09/10iphone.html> at 15 October 2007. 
20  Saul Hansell, The $831 iPhone (2007) New York Times 
<http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2007/10/25/the-831-iphone/> at 7 January 2008. 
21  Ibid. 
22  Richard Wray, O2 wins Apple iPhone deal – at a hefty price (2007) The Guardian 
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2007/sep/17/mobilephones.apple> at 7 January 2007. 
23  With the exception of using the iPhone to call an emergency services number, such as 112 or 911. 
24  AT&T appears to make an exception for users with poor credit ratings, who are permitted to use a 
month-to-month plan at a higher fee. 
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B Circumventing the iPhone-AT&T technological tie 
 
The US launch of the iPhone started another round of the DRM v The People arms race.  
In less than two months, George Hotz, a 17-year old American student publicly 
announced a method of unlocking the iPhone.25  Hotz’s original method involved 
disassembling the iPhone and soldering its components, and as such required 
specialised skills, making this method unsuitable for most consumers.26
 
Software-only unlocking methods were developed thereafter, and iPhone unlocking 
software tools have evolved to the point where they can be used by ordinary 
consumers.27  Many observers would have expected Apple Inc. to sue under anti-
circumvention laws to suppress the development and distribution of these tools, yet this 
has not yet happened.  There appears to have been only one reported case in which 
Apple or AT&T has even threatened legal proceedings.28
 
Yet if Apple Inc. is showing restraint in dealing with iPhone unlocking via the legal 
system, it seems to be striking back at a technological and customer support level.  
Apple announced that the unlocking of an iPhone, by software or otherwise, would void 
the warranty on the iPhone, a claim which is supported by the warranty 
documentation.29  Some commentators have argued that this action violates the 
Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act30 and is unlawful.31  Apple Inc. has also announced that 
unlocking the iPhone is a violation of the user’s licence to use the iPhone software.32
 
Apple Inc. has also signalled an intention to continue working against unlocking tools 
and unlocked iPhones at a technological level.  Apple CEO Steve Jobs described the 
problem of unlocking as ‘a constant cat and mouse game … we have to stay one step 
ahead of them.  It’s our job to keep them from breaking in.’33
                                                
25  George Hotz, Full Hardware Unlock of iPhone Done (2007) Finding JTAG on the iPhone 
<http://iphonejtag.blogspot.com/2007/08/full-hardware-unlock-of-iphone-done.html> at 16 October 
2007; Brad Stone, With Software and Soldering, AT&T’s Lock on iPhone is Undone (2007) The New 
York Times Online 
<http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9F0DE6DC113CF936A1575BC0A9619C8B63> at 
16 October 2007. 
26  Hotz later traded the first unlocked iPhone for a Nissan 350Z sports car: Chris Shunk, Teen Trades 
First Unlocked iPhone for Nissan 350Z (2007) <http://www.autoblog.com/2007/08/28/teen-trades-
first-unlocked-iphone-for-nissan-350z/> at 16 October 2007. 
27  See, eg kGizmodo, How the First iPhone Unlock Went Down [UPDATED] (2007) 
<http://gizmodo.com/gadgets/exclusive/first-iphone-unlock-license-sold-works-but-shows-problems-
298300.php> at 16 October 2007. 
28 BBC News, Legal Threats Halt iPhone Crack (2007) 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/technology/6966600.stm> at 16 October 2007. 
29  Apple, Apple One (1) Year Limited Warranty (2007) 
<http://images.apple.com/legal/warranty/iphone.pdf> at 18 October 2007. 
30  15 USC §§ 2301-2312.  The Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act is a US federal statute which governs 
warranties on consumer products. 
31  Christopher Price, Did Apple Violate Magnuson-Moss over iPhone Unlocks? (2007) Phone News 
<http://www.phonenews.com/content/view/2386/9/> at 16 October 2007. 
32  iPhone News Blog, Unlocking iPhone Can Cause Permanent Damage! (2007) 
<http://www.iphonenewsblog.com/2007/09/unlocking-iphone-can-cause-per.html> at 16 October 
2007. 
33  Thomas Ricker, Live from Apple’s “Mum is No Longer the Word” event in London (2007) Engadget 
<http://www.engadget.com/2007/09/18/live-from-apples-mum-is-no-longer-the-word-event-in-
london/> at 16 October 2007. 
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Apple Inc. has also released updated software for the iPhone which, if installed on an 
unlocked iPhone, will permanently disable the device.34  While Apple Inc. attribute this 
result to ‘irreparable damage’ said to be caused to the iPhone’s software by 
‘unauthorized iPhone unlocking programs’, and deny that it is intentionally disabling 
unlocked iPhones, consumer reaction has been considerably more sceptical. 
 
At least two class action lawsuits have been filed against Apple Inc. in the US in 
relation to the iPhone, alleging contraventions of federal and state antitrust and 
consumer protection laws, as well as other causes of action.35
 
III TRADE PRACTICES ACT ANALYSIS OF IPHONE TYING 
 
The iPhone is expected to be launched in Australia some time in early 2008.36  Given 
that Apple Inc. has an exclusive agreement with AT&T in the US,37 and has announced 
exclusive agreements in Germany, France and the UK,38 Apple may well pursue a 
similar marketing strategy in Australia. 
 
It is not clear whether Apple inc will itself sell the iPhone in Australia.  Apple Inc. sells 
the iPhone to the public in the US, and has announced its intention to do so in the UK, 
but in Germany and France, Apple’s chosen mobile carrier is the sole authorised39 
source of the iPhone.40
 
Of the mobile networks in Australia, only Telstra’s network supports the EDGE 
technology which the iPhone uses for high-speed data transfer.41  This might make 
Telstra appear the logical partner for Apple, but senior Telstra executives have publicly 
criticised the iPhone as ‘old hat’ and suggested that Apple should stay out of the mobile 
phone market.42
 
In the course of writing this article, we requested comment from Apple Inc. on how the 
iPhone would be distributed in Australia.  Apple Inc. declined to comment on what it 
described as ‘rumour and speculation’ concerning the launch of the iPhone in 
Australia.43
 
                                                
34  Jacqui Cheng, Apple: Firmware Update Likely to Make Unlocked iPhones “Permanently 
Inoperable” (2007) Ars Technica <http://arstechnica.com/news.ars/post/20070924-apple-firmware-
update-likely-to-make-unlocked-iphones-permanently-inoperable.html> at 16 October 2007. 
35  Hohlman v Apple Inc., No 5:07-cv-05152-RS (ND Cal, filed 5 October 2007); Smith v Apple Inc., No 
1-07-CV-095781 (Sup Court of Cal, filed 5 October 2007). 
36  APC Magazine, Australia Won’t See iPhone ‘till 2008 (2007) 
<http://apcmag.com/4959/australia_wont_see_iphone_til_2008> at 16 October 2007. 
37  Apple, Apple Chooses Cingular as Exclusive US Carrier for Its Revolutionary iPhone (2007) 
<http://www.apple.com/pr/library/2007/01/09cingular.html> at 14 January 2008. 
38  Apple, above n 12. 
39  We say the sole authorised source because parallel-imported iPhones with the technological ties to 
AT&T circumvented are currently available in Australia via eBay and other methods. 
40  Above n 13. 
41  The Sydney Morning Herald, Telstra to Apple: ‘Stick to your Knitting’ (2007) 
<http://www.smh.com.au/news/biztech/telstra-to-apple-stick-to-your-
knitting/2007/02/15/1171405363291.html> at 16 October 2007. 
42  Ibid. 
43  Email from John Marx (Apple PR executive) to Dale Clapperton, 18 October 2007. 
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For the purposes of our analysis we will assume the following facts: 
 
• Apple will enter into an exclusive distribution contract with a single Australian 
mobile carrier (‘Carrier’); 
• the Carrier will sell the iPhone to the public, but Apple Inc. may or may not do so;44 
• where the identity of the Carrier is relevant, the Carrier will be Telstra;45 
• as in the US, the iPhone will be sold in a disabled state and will not  be able to be 
‘activated’ without entering into a new mobile phone contract with the Carrier; 
• as in the US, the iPhone, even after ‘activation’, will not be able to be used with the 
mobile services of any company other than the Carrier; and 
• as in the US, the iPhone retail packaging will contain a statement that entering into a 
new mobile phone contract with the Carrier is necessary to activate the iPhone. 
 
A Third-line forcing 
 
In this section, we discuss third-line forcing in the context of Apple Inc. selling the 
iPhone, as well as the Carrier.  This may constitute third-line forcing by Apple Inc.. 
Where the iPhone is sold by the carrier only, this may constitute exclusive dealing 
(tying) by the carrier and is discussed below in section III C 2. 
 
Exclusive dealing is prohibited by s 47(1) of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth).  Most 
types of exclusive dealing are unlawful only if they have the purpose, or are likely to 
have the effect of substantially lessening competition.46  Third-line forcing, however, is 
a form of exclusive dealing that is unlawful per se.  The nature of third-line forcing is 
such that it is reasonable to presume that it harms competition, and so actual harm need 
not be shown.47  Once it is found that a company has engaged in third-line forcing, 
arguments that it did not substantially lessen competition are irrelevant.48
 
In this respect, the competition laws of Australia are somewhat unique – in the US, EU, 
and most other countries, third-line forcing is treated no differently from any other kind 
of exclusionary conduct. 
 
Third-line forcing involves at least two separate suppliers.49  Company A sells product 
A on the condition that the purchaser also acquires product B from company B, or 
                                                
44  As we discuss below, if Apple Inc. were to sell the iPhone to the public in Australia, its conduct 
would likely constitute per-se unlawful third line forcing.  This may be a factor which weighs against 
Apple Inc. doing so. 
45  Much of our evaluation involves per-se contraventions of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth), where 
the identity of the Carrier is not relevant because an actual or likely lessening of competition need 
not be shown. 
46  Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) s 47(10). 
47  ‘The rationale behind a per se prohibition is that the conduct prohibited is so likely to be detrimental 
to economic welfare, and so unlikely to be beneficial, that it should be proscribed without further 
inquiry about its impact on competition.’: Commonwealth, Review of the Competition Provisions of 
the Trade Practices Act (2003) 123. 
48  S Corones, Competition Law in Australia (Lawbook Co, 4th ed, 2007) [9.125]. 
49  Since the commencement of amendments made by the Trade Practices Legislation Amendment Act 
(No 1) 2006 (Cth), companies which are related body corporates are treated as a single entity for the 
purposes of third line forcing: ibid. 
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Company A refuses to sell product A because the prospective purchaser would not 
agree to acquire product B from company B.50
 
Third-line forcing is defined in ss 47(6) and 47(7) of the Trade Practices Act 1974 
(Cth).  Section 47 of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) provides that: 
 
(1) Subject to this section, a corporation shall not, in trade or commerce, engage in 
the practice of exclusive dealing. 
… 
(6) A corporation also engages in the practice of exclusive dealing if the 
corporation: 
(a) supplies, or offers to supply, goods or services; 
(b) supplies, or offers to supply, goods or services at a particular price; or 
(c) gives or allows, or offers to give or allow, a discount, allowance, rebate or credit in 
relation to the supply or proposed supply of goods or services by the corporation; 
on the condition that the person to whom the corporation supplies or offers or proposes to 
supply the goods or services or, if that person is a body corporate, a body corporate 
related to that body corporate will acquire goods or services of a particular kind or 
description directly or indirectly from another person not being a body corporate related 
to the corporation. 
 
Section 47(7) is in similar terms to s 47(6), but defines third line forcing by reference to 
a refusal to supply for the reason that the person supplied has not acquired goods or 
services from a third party, or agreed to do so. 
 
Thus, in order to satisfy the definition of third line forcing in s 47(6) it is necessary to 
satisfy the following elements: 
 
• two separate products, Product A and Product B; 
• three parties, Supplier A, Supplier B and the Customer; 
• Supplier A will supply Product A to the Customer only on the condition that the 
Customer acquires Product B from Supplier B.  
 
The basis upon which Apple Inc. will conduct sales of iPhones in Australia has not yet 
been announced.  In this section we consider the implications of a number of 
possibilities. 
 
1 First Characterisation  
 
If Apple Inc. supplies or offers to supply goods (the iPhone) on the condition that the 
purchaser will acquire mobile phone services from the Carrier, the conduct will clearly 
fall within s 47(6). 
 
There would be two contracts: one between Apple and the purchaser for purchase of the 
iPhone itself, and a separate contract between the Carrier and the purchaser for the 
supply of mobile telephony services.  This would negate any ‘package deal’ defences.51
 
                                                
50  References to ‘goods’ in these examples should be treated as interchangeable with ‘services’. 
51  See, eg ACCC v IMB Group Pty Ltd (in liq) [2002] FCA 402. 
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The next question to be addressed is whether the iPhone would be supplied on the 
condition that the purchaser acquired mobile telephony services from the Carrier.  Apart 
from the notice on the back of the retail iPhone packaging to the effect that entering into 
a new contract with the Carrier is required to activate the iPhone, there seems to be no 
express statement from Apple Inc. that the purchaser is in fact under an obligation to 
contract with the Carrier. 
 
However, ‘condition’ within the meaning of s 47 encompasses more than just express 
contractual conditions, and has a meaning ‘uncircumscribed by contract law notions.’52  
Section 47(13) provides that: 
 
(13) In this section: 
(a)  a reference to a condition shall be read as a reference to any condition, whether direct 
or indirect and whether having legal or equitable force or not, and includes a reference to 
a condition the existence or nature of which is ascertainable only by inference from the 
conduct of persons or from other relevant circumstances;  
 
The ‘condition’ however must involve more than a mere hope or expectation,53 and 
must involve some element of compulsion to acquire the second product.54  In SWB 
Family Credit Union Ltd v Parramatta Tourist Services Pty Ltd, Northrop J said: 
 
It does not matter whether the condition is legally binding or not, see s 47(13)(a) … but in 
my opinion the condition must have some attributes of compulsion and futurity.  This can 
be expressed in the form ‘If we do this, you will (must) do that.’  A condition in the 
nature of an obligation must be imposed upon the person dealing with the corporation.  
The condition to be complied with must result from something done or to be done by the 
corporation imposing the condition.55
 
The iPhone is sold in a disabled state, and cannot be used until it is ‘activated’, which 
can only be performed once the purchaser has entered into a contract with the Carrier.  
Although entering into a contract with the Carrier is not, strictly speaking, a condition 
of purchasing an iPhone, the iPhone is all but useless unless and until the purchaser 
contracts with the Carrier.  There is a very real practical compulsion on the consumer to 
acquire mobile telephony services from the Carrier. 
 
The availability of methods to circumvent the DRM which locks the customer into a 
particular carrier would be unlikely to affect this conclusion, especially given that those 
methods may be unlawful, would void the warranty of the phone, contravene the 
software licence agreement, and Apple Inc. is taking technological steps to prevent their 
use. 
 
A court would be likely to infer the existence of a ‘condition’ in the terms suggested, 
based on the conduct of Apple Inc. and the technological locking of the iPhone. 
 
                                                
52  Visy Paper Pty Ltd v ACCC (2003) 216 CLR 1, 6 (Gleeson CJ, McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ). 
53  SWB Family Credit Union Ltd v Parramatta Tourist Services Pty Ltd (1980) 32 ALR 365. 
54  Corones, above n 48, 508; cf TPC v Tepeda Pty Ltd (1994) ATPR 41-319. 
55  SWB Family Credit Union Ltd v Parramatta Tourist Services Pty Ltd (1980) 32 ALR 365, 381. 
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If the Carrier or Apple were also to sell an ‘unlocked’ version of the iPhone at a higher 
price,56 this would not affect the conclusion that this behaviour would constitute third-
line forcing.  Section 47(6) of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) encompasses not only 
supply of goods or services upon a relevant condition, but supply of goods or services at 
a particular price, or giving or allowing a discount or rebate, upon a relevant condition. 
 
2 Second characterisation  
 
Apple Inc. could argue that it is not supplying the iPhone on the condition that the 
customer acquires the Carrier’s services.  Rather, any condition which exists relates 
only to the use of the software on the iPhone, which is a different issue to the chattel 
ownership of the iPhone itself.  For the reasons given above, a court would be likely to 
reject this argument. 
 
If this characterisation of Apple’s conduct is accepted, it would satisfy the definition of 
third-line forcing in ss 47(6) or 47(7).  A licence to use the iPhone software, or actually 
permitting use of the software (by the ‘activation’ process) would arguably fall within 
the statutory definition of ‘services’ in s 4 of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth).  
Similarly, Apple Inc.’s licensing of the software, or permitting its use, would arguably 
fall within the statutory definition of ‘supply’, which includes ‘provide, grant or 
confer.’57
 
Apple Inc.’s conduct could then be characterised as either supply of services (software 
service) on the condition that the consumer acquire mobile telephony services from the 
Carrier, or a refusal to supply services because the Carrier’s services had not been 
acquired. 
 
On either of the first or second characterisations of Apple Inc.’s conduct, to the extent 
that it sells or offers to sell the iPhone in these circumstances, Apple will engage in 
unlawful third-line forcing. 
 
Where the iPhones are sold by the Carrier, because they are forcing the acquisition of 
their own services, and not the services of a third party, their conduct would constitute 
second line forcing or tying rather than third-line forcing. 
 
Where the iPhones are sold by retailers other than Apple Inc. or the Carrier, the 
situation is less clear.  Are the retailers engaging in third-line forcing, given that they 
merely resell the iPhones and have no role in the imposition of the technological 
requirement to acquire services from the Carrier?  Or is Apple Inc. engaging in third-






                                                
56  As is occurring in France and Germany: Tony Smith, Orange to offer unlocked iPhones for €749, 
(2007) Register Hardware <http://www.reghardware.co.uk/2007/11/28/orange_prices_up_iphone/> 
at 14 January 2008. 
57  Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) s 4. 
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3 Third Characterisation 
 
Apple Inc. has announced that in Germany and France, it will not itself sell iPhones.  
Instead they will be available exclusively from their nominated carrier.  Whether this is 
due to a smaller presence of Apple Inc. retail stores in those countries is unclear. 
 
If Apple Inc. were to adopt this approach in Australia it may nevertheless engage in 
third-line forcing.  The language of s 47 of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) is not 
concerned with sale, but with supply of goods or services.58  The fact that title to the 
iPhone (ie the physical device) is acquired from the Carrier does not exclude the 
possibility that Apple Inc. is providing some other goods or services to the consumer. 
 
If, notwithstanding that title to the iPhone is acquired from the Carrier, Apple Inc. is 
supplying goods or services of some kind to the consumer, on the condition that mobile 
telephony services are acquired from the Carrier, then Apple Inc.’s conduct may still 
fall within s 47(6) and constitute third-line forcing.59
 
The iPhone is essentially a very small computer, in the shape of a mobile phone and 
having the functionality of a mobile phone and a computer combined.  Like all 
computers, it requires software to operate.60
 
Supply, in relation to services, includes to ‘provide, grant or confer.’61  Section 4 of the 
Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) contains a broad and inclusive definition of ‘services’, 
which includes ‘rights, benefits, privileges or facilities that are … provided, granted or 
conferred in trade or commerce’.  Whether or not computer software, or a licence to use 
such software, constitutes ‘goods’ or ‘services’ within the meaning of the Trade 
Practices Act 1974 (Cth) has not been finally determined in Australia.62  We think the 
better view is that a licence to use computer software falls within the definition of 
‘services’, although the distinction is of no relevance for present purposes so long as it 
is one or the other.63
 
Is Apple Inc. supplying services – ie a licence to use the iPhone software – to the 
consumer?  The answer lies within Apple Inc.’s own legal documents.  Like most 
computer software, the use of the iPhone software is subject to an End User Licence 
                                                
58  See, eg Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) s 47(6): ‘A corporation also engages in the practice of 
exclusive dealing if the corporation … supplies, or offers to supply, goods or services.’ 
59  Similarly, if Apple Inc. refuses to supply services because the consumer has not acquired, or agreed 
to acquire, services from the Carrier, s 47(7) would apply. 
60  If the software becomes irrecoverably corrupted, the iPhone becomes similarly useless.  When Apple 
Inc.’s recent software update to the iPhones caused unlocked iPhones to become inoperable in this 
way, the term ‘iBrick’ was coined to describe such phones. 
61  Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) s 4. 
62  ASX Operations Pty Ltd v Pont Data Australia Pty Ltd (No 1) (1990) 27 FCR 460, 468.  See also 
Toby Constructions Products Pty Ltd v Computa Bar (Sales) Pty Ltd [1983] 2 NSWLR 48, in which 
it was held that the supply of a computer system comprising hardware and software was a supply of 
goods. 
63  The distinction between a software licence as a supply of goods or services is of more importance in 
the context of implied warranties under Part V, Division 2 of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth). 
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Agreement or 'EULA'.64  The EULA must be agreed to by the user before the iPhone 
can be activated.65
 
The EULA states in relevant part:  
 
PLEASE READ THIS SOFTWARE LICENSE AGREEMENT ("LICENSE") 
CAREFULLY BEFORE USING YOUR iPHONE. BY USING YOUR iPHONE, 
YOU ARE AGREEING TO BE BOUND BY THE TERMS OF THIS LICENSE. IF 
YOU DO NOT AGREE TO THE TERMS OF THIS LICENSE, DO NOT USE THE 
iPHONE. IF YOU DO NOT AGREE TO THE TERMS OF THE LICENSE, YOU 
MAY RETURN THE iPHONE TO THE PLACE WHERE YOU OBTAINED IT 
FOR A REFUND. [emphasis in original] 
 
The software (including Boot ROM code and other embedded software), documentation 
and any fonts that came with your iPhone, whether in read only memory, on any other 
media or in any other form (collectively the "iPhone Software") are licensed, not sold, 
to you by Apple Inc.. ("Apple") for use only under the terms of this License, and Apple 
reserves all rights not expressly granted to you.66 [emphasis added] 
 
Although there is no express provision of the EULA which compels the consumer to 
acquire services from the Carrier, as discussed above, a court would likely infer the 
existence of such a condition because of the technological locking and activation 
process.  Further, the EULA specifically prohibits modification of the iPhone software, 
which would be necessary to circumvent the activation and technological locking. 
 
We concede that this characterisation is somewhat contrived.  Nonetheless, it is clear 
that Apple Inc. is licensing the use of the iPhone software under a contract between 
Apple Inc. and the consumer (the EULA) which is separate and independent of any 
contracts between the consumer and the Carrier.  If this is a supply of goods or services, 
upon a relevant condition, it is arguably third-line forcing. 
 
B Exclusionary Provisions – s 45(2)(a)(i) 
 
The Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) prohibits certain ‘horizontal’ contracts, 
arrangements or understandings between companies who are competitors, or are likely 
to be competitors, or who would (or would likely) be competitors but for the agreement. 
Such agreements are prohibited per se if they contain an exclusionary provision,67 and 
are otherwise prohibited if a provision of the agreement has the purpose, effect, or 
would likely have the effect, of substantially lessening competition.68  Giving effect to 
such a provision is subject to a separate prohibition.69
 
                                                
64  For a discussion of EULA's and consumer protection concerns in electronic contracts generally, see 
D Clapperton and S Corones, ‘Unfair Terms in “Clickwrap” and Other Electronic Contracts’ (2007) 
35 Australian Business Law Review 152. 
65  By way of a ‘clickwrap’ licence.  
66  Apple, iPHONE SOFTWARE LICENSE AGREEMENT (2007) 
<http://images.apple.com/legal/sla/docs/iphone.pdf> at 17 October 2007. 
67  Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) s 45(2)(a)(i). 
68  Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) s 45(2)(a)(ii). 
69  Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) ss 45(2)(b)(i), (ii). 
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As with exclusive dealing, being able to establish a per se contravention is beneficial to 
a potential applicant, because it avoids the problematic evidentiary issues inherent in 
establishing that the purpose, effect, or likely effect of the impugned provision was to 
substantially lessen competition.  Sections 45(2) and (3) of the Trade Practices Act 
1974 (Cth) provide: 
 
(2) A corporation shall not: 
(a) make a contract or arrangement, or arrive at an understanding, if: 
(i) the proposed contract, arrangement or understanding contains an 
exclusionary provision; or 
(ii) a provision of the proposed contract, arrangement or understanding 
has the purpose, or would have or be likely to have the effect, of 
substantially lessening competition; or 
(b) give effect to a provision of a contract, arrangement or understanding, whether 
the contract or arrangement was made, or the understanding was arrived at, 
before or after the commencement of this section, if that provision: 
(i) is an exclusionary provision; or 
(ii) has the purpose, or has or is likely to have the effect, of substantially 
lessening competition. 
(3) For the purposes of this section …, competition, in relation to a provision of a 
contract, arrangement or understanding or of a proposed contract, arrangement or 
understanding, means competition in any market in which a corporation that is a party 
to the contract, arrangement or understanding or would be a party to the proposed 
contract, arrangement or understanding, or any body corporate related to such a 
corporation, supplies or acquires, or is likely to supply or acquire, goods or services 
or would, but for the provision, supply or acquire, or be likely to supply or acquire, 
goods or services. [emphasis added] 
 
‘Exclusionary provision’ is defined by s 4D of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth): 
 
(1) A provision of a contract, arrangement or understanding, or of a proposed contract, 
arrangement or understanding, shall be taken to be an exclusionary provision for the 
purposes of this Act if: 
(a) the contract or arrangement was made, or the understanding was arrived at, or 
the proposed contract or arrangement is to be made, or the proposed 
understanding is to be arrived at, between persons any 2 or more of whom are 
competitive with each other; and 
(b) the provision has the purpose of preventing, restricting or limiting: 
(i) the supply of goods or services to, or the acquisition of goods or services 
from, particular persons or classes of persons; or 
(ii) the supply of goods or services to, or the acquisition of goods or services 
from, particular persons or classes of persons in particular circumstances or 
on particular conditions; 
by all or any of the parties to the contract, arrangement or understanding or of the 
proposed parties to the proposed contract, arrangement or understanding or, if a 
party or proposed party is a body corporate, by a body corporate that is related to 
the body corporate. 
(2) A person shall be deemed to be competitive with another person for the purposes of 
subsection (1) if, and only if, the first-mentioned person or a body corporate that is 
related to that person is, or is likely to be, or, but for the provision of any contract, 
arrangement or understanding or of any proposed contract, arrangement or 
understanding, would be, or would be likely to be, in competition with the other 
person, or with a body corporate that is related to the other person, in relation to the 
supply or acquisition of all or any of the goods or services to which the relevant 
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provision of the contract, arrangement or understanding or of the proposed contract, 
arrangement or understanding relates. 
 
As is apparent from ss 45(3) and 4D(2), a threshold issue for the application of these 
sections to the hypothetical Apple-Carrier agreement is that Apple Inc. and the Carrier 
must be competitors in the relevant sense.  That is, that Apple Inc. and the Carrier: 
 
• are in fact competitors in any market; 
• are likely to be competitors in any market; or 
• except for the impugned term(s) of the agreement, would be competitors or would 
be likely to be competitors in any market. 
 
The Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) defines markets in economic terms.  Section 4E of 
the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) provides: 
 
For the purposes of this Act, unless the contrary intention appears, market means a 
market in Australia and, when used in relation to any goods or services, includes a market 
for those goods or services and other goods or services that are substitutable for, or 
otherwise competitive with, the first-mentioned goods or services. 
 
A number of possible markets suggest themselves: 
 
• a market for mobile phone handsets; 
• a market for mobile telephony services; and 
• a ‘cluster market’ for mobile phone handsets together with mobile telephony 
services as a package. 
 
It could be argued that the iPhone constitutes a separate market; this is discussed 
below.70  The Carrier would compete in each of the possible markets identified above, 
but would Apple Inc.? 
 
1 Market for handsets 
 
If Apple Inc. sells the iPhone in Australia, it would compete in this market, although it 
could be argued that since the iPhones it sells are locked to the Carrier’s network, Apple 
Inc. is not, strictly speaking, competing with the Carrier.  If Apple does not sell the 
iPhone in Australia, the question then is whether it would, or would be likely to sell the 
iPhone in Australia, but for a term of the agreement with the Carrier. 
 
Whether Apple would be likely to do so is a question of fact.  It does not require that it 
be more likely than not, only that there is a ‘real chance or possibility’ it would occur.71  
Establishing this point would depend on the available evidence at trial, but the fact that 
Apple Inc. itself sells the iPhone in the US and has announced its intention to do so in 
the UK would support such a finding.  If there is a ‘real chance or possibility’ that 
Apple would sell the iPhone in Australia if not for a term of the agreement with the 
Carrier, Apple and the Carrier will be deemed to be competitors within the meaning of 
ss 45 and 4D. 
                                                
70  See part IIIC1. 
71  News Ltd v Australian Rugby Football League Ltd (1996) 64 FCR 410. 
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2 Market for mobile telephony services 
 
Considering mobile telephony services in isolation from handsets, Apple Inc. does not 
compete in this market and is not likely to do so.  The extent of Apple Inc.’s interest in 
the mobile telephony services market appears to be artificially restricting the choice of 
carrier of iPhone users. 
 
3 Cluster market for handsets and services 
 
A ‘cluster market’ refers to a market for a bundle of products that are technical or 
commercial complements and are purchased as a bundle by consumers.72  Stated more 
formally, it is a market in which the transaction costs involved in providing specific 
goods and services separately would be so great as to necessitate their provision 
together.73
 
Ergas writes that to say that a cluster market for products A and B exists is to imply that 
a firm selling only A or only B would not be able to compete with one selling both A 
and B; either because the supply cost of producing A and B jointly is substantially 
below that of producing them separately, and/or because consumers incur additional 
costs when they purchase A and B separately as against purchasing them jointly.74
 
In the case of a potential cluster market for mobile phone handsets and mobile 
telephony services, there are no supply-side economies of joint production,75 but there 
would be economies which result from offering a single source of supply for both 
handsets and telephony services.  Consumers acquiring handsets and services separately 
would also incur higher transactional costs than if they acquired them from a single 
supplier,76 and there is a substantial consumer and supplier demand for 
telecommunications services to be supplied as a ‘bundle’.77  Goss suggests that: 
 
the nature of bundled services is such that a bundle of services is more likely to be treated 
as forming a cluster market than a series of unbundled telecommunications services 
supplied to a consumer.  This is the case because the transactional costs for both suppliers 
and consumers of, respectively, supplying and receiving the services indicate that they are 
more efficiently supplied as a bundle.  Accordingly, a firm selling those services 
separately could not compete with one selling them together.  The prevalence of bundled 
telecommunications services suggests that there will be a high incidence of situations in 
which cluster market analysis of competitive effects will be appropriate.78
 
                                                
72  Corones, above n 48, [2.40]; see also Henry Ergas, Cluster Markets: What They Are and How To 
Test For Them (2002) The Wayback Machine 
<http://web.archive.org/web/20050623113852/http://necg.com.au/pappub/papers-ergas-cluster.PDF> 
at 25 October 2007. 
73  A Goss, ‘The Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) and the Treatment of Cluster Markets in the Australian 
Telecommunications Industry’ (2001) 25 Melbourne University Law Review 481, 482; see also 
Ergas, above n 72, 3-4. 
74  Ergas, above n 72, 3. 
75  As might be the case in, for example, the joint production of wool and lamb. 
76  Corones, above n 48, [2.40]. 
77  Goss, above n 73, 492. 
78  Ibid, 493. 
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In the context of ‘land-line’ telephone services, the ACCC considers that fixed line 
rental and local call services are part of a cluster market,79 although Ergas believes that 
local, STD, and IDD services each form separate markets.80
 
If the existence of a cluster market comprising mobile phone handsets and mobile 
telephony services is accepted, the next question is whether Apple Inc. could be 
properly viewed as a competitor of the Carrier in the relevant sense, given that Apple 
Inc. would (or arguably, would be likely to, but for a provision of the Apple-Carrier 
agreement) only supply handsets? 
 
Statements in the literature that, in economic terms, a company supplying only one 
element of a cluster market ‘could not compete’ with a company supplying all elements, 
mean in lay terms that they could not compete profitably, all other things being equal.  
The wording of ss 45(3) and 4D(2) do not preclude a finding that a corporation which 
supplies only one element of a cluster market is nonetheless a competitor of a 
corporation supplying all elements. 
 
If Apple Inc. sells the iPhone in Australia, it would arguably compete in this cluster 
market.  If Apple Inc. does not sell the iPhone in Australia, it could be argued that, but 
for a term of the Apple-Carrier agreement, it would be likely to do so. 
 
4 Exclusionary provision 
 
If we assume that Apple Inc. and the Carrier are competitors in the relevant sense in at 
least one of the above markets, the next question is whether a term of the Apple-Carrier 
contract, arrangement or understanding is an exclusionary provision within the meaning 
of s 4D.  The primary purpose of the Apple-Carrier agreement would be to prevent, 
restrict, or limit the supply of iPhones to particular persons on particular conditions – 
that is, that Apple Inc. would not supply iPhones to any of the Carrier’s competitors in 
Australia; or would not supply iPhones to the public unless they acquired the Carrier’s 
services; or would not supply iPhones to the public at all.81
 
Provided that Apple Inc. and the Carrier are competitors within the meaning of ss 45 
and 4D, the Apple-Carrier agreement will probably contain one or more exclusionary 
terms, with the consequence that the making of that agreement would be a per se 
contravention of s 45(2), as would giving effect to such a provision. 
 
C Other potential Part IV actions 
 





                                                
79  ACCC, Declaration of Local Telecommunications Services under Part XIC of the Trade Practices 
Act 1974 (July 1999) 40. 
80  Ergas, above n 72, 17-18. 
81  An exclusive distribution agreement would not ordinarily contravene s 45(2) unless the supplier was 
vertically integrated and sold at a ‘retail’ level, in competition with the other party. 
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1 Misuse of market power – s 46(1) 
 
Section 46(1) of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) deals with misuse of market power, 
and is historically one of the most difficult contraventions of Part IV to establish.  A 
threshold issue is whether Apple Inc. has a substantial degree of market power.  In any 
possible market we discuss above, Apple would not have market power.  But if there is 
a separate market for iPhones, Apple Inc. as the manufacturer and sole source of supply 
would have substantial market power. 
 
The Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) defines markets in economic terms, and a market 
for goods or services includes any other goods or services that are substitutable for or 
otherwise competitive with the first goods or services.82  If the iPhone is sufficiently 
unique in terms of its features,83 desirability, and brand loyalty,84 that consumers would 
not regard an ordinary mobile phone as a substitute for an iPhone, this would weigh 
strongly in favour of the existence of a separate market for the iPhone. 
 
A starting point for determining the issue of substitutability is the SSNIP test (Small but 
Significant Non-transitory Increase in Price).85  Here, the SSNIP test asks whether 
Apple Inc. would find it profitable to increase the price of the iPhone by 5-10% for a 
non-transitory period of time, say 12 months.  If the price increase causes consumers 
who would have bought iPhones to instead by a different phone, and the reduction in 
sales makes the price increase unprofitable for Apple, this is a strong indicator that other 
phones are substitutable for the iPhone, and the iPhone does not comprise a separate 
market. 
 
If, on the other hand, consumers continue to buy the iPhone at the higher price, making 
the price increase profitable for Apple, this is a strong indicator that other phones are 
not substitutable for the iPhone, and that the iPhone may constitute a separate market. 
Australian courts have rejected several previous attempts to define a market in terms of 
a single trade marked product,86 brand of vehicle,87 or copyright work.88  However, the 
courts have not rejected the possibility that a single brand product may constitute a 
separate economic market.89
 
Even if the iPhone does not constitute a separate market, it may be part of a broader 
market for next generation mobile phones, or ‘smartphones.’  At the present time, Apple 
may have substantial market power within such a market, but as competitors enter that 
                                                
82  Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) s 4E. 
83  Apple Inc.’s own statements about the revolutionary and ground-breaking nature of the iPhone could 
lend support to the view that the iPhone comprises a separate market: Apple, above n 7.  
84  A single brand market may exist where the evidence supports a finding that consumers purchase a 
product solely in reliance upon its brand name and not in reliance upon the physical qualities of the 
product: CCH, Trade Practices Commentary [¶2-560].  Anecdotal market evidence suggests that 
Apple Inc. has cultivated substantial brand loyalty. 
85  Corones, above n 48, [2.25] 
86  Mark Lyons Pty Ltd v Bursill Sportsgear Pty Ltd (1987) 75 ALR 581. 
87  J Ah Toy Pty Ltd v Thiess Toyota Pty Ltd (1980) 3 ATPR ¶40-155. 
88  Broderbund Software Inc. v Computermate Products (Australia) Pty Ltd (1991) 22 IPR 215. 
89  Melway Publishing Pty Ltd v Robert Hicks Pty Ltd (2001) 205 CLR 1, 34; see also Clapperton and 
Corones, above n 2, 694-5; Corones, above n 1, 50-2. 
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market with competing devices, that position might erode to the point where they lack 
substantial market power and a contravention of s 46(1) would no longer be possible. 
 
The existence of Apple Inc.’s substantial market power would need to be assessed over 
a period of years rather than months and would depend, in particular, on the existence of 
barriers to entry.90  Apple Inc.’s intellectual property in the iPhone, such as the 
copyright in the computer software may not confer a substantial degree of market 
power.  There is growing recognition that traditional market definition procedure is 
flawed in innovative industries because it fails to take account of technological change 
and its effects on future competition and market power.91
 
Assuming that a separate market for iPhones can be established, it would also need to 
be established that Apple Inc. had taken advantage of its substantial market power, and 
did so for a purpose proscribed by s 46(1).92
 
2 Exclusive dealing other than third-line forcing – s 47(2) 
 
Regardless of whether Apple Inc. sells the iPhone in Australia or not, the Carrier may 
engage in exclusive dealing (other than third-line forcing) under s 47(2) of the Trade 
Practices Act 1974 (Cth), which provides in part: 
 
(2) A corporation engages in the practice of exclusive dealing if the corporation: 
(a) supplies, or offers to supply, goods or services; 
… 
on the condition that the person to whom the corporation supplies, or offers or 
proposes to supply, the goods or services or, if that person is a body corporate, a 
body corporate related to that body corporate: 
(d) will not, or will not except to a limited extent, acquire goods or services, or 
goods or services of a particular kind or description, directly or indirectly from 
a competitor of the corporation or from a competitor of a body corporate related 
to the corporation; 
 
Here, the Carrier would supply the iPhone on a condition that the purchaser would not, 
or would not except to a limited extent, acquire mobile phone services from a 
competitor of the Carrier. 
 
However, this section is subject to a further requirement that the Carrier’s actions must 
have the purpose, effect or likely effect of substantially lessening competition.93  
Whether it is likely to have that effect or not would be a question of fact and dependant 
on the size of the market, the number of iPhones sold, and other factors. 
 
                                                
90  Corones, above n 48, [2.190]. 
91  See R Gilbert and S Sunshine, ‘Incorporating Dynamic Efficiency concerns in Merger analysis – The 
Use of Innovative Markets’ (1995) 63 Antitrust Law Journal 569; and R Posner, ‘Antitrust in the 
New Economy’ (2001) 68 Antitrust Law Journal 925. 
92  The proscribed purposes are eliminating or substantially damaging a competitor of the corporation in 
that or any other market, preventing the entry of a person into that or any other market, and deterring 
or preventing a person from engaging in competitive conduct in that or any other market.  See 
generally Corones, above n 1, 57-64. 
93  Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) s 47(10). 
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But the purpose of the Carrier in distributing the locked iPhones would arguably be to 
substantially lessen competition, by ensuring that any consumers using those iPhones 
could not use them with the Carrier’s competitors.  A court can infer purpose from the 
nature of the arrangement the circumstances in which it was made, and its likely 
effect.94  The purpose of substantially lessening competition need not be the sole 
purpose of the Carrier, so long as it was one of their purposes, and was a substantial or 
operative purpose.95
 
If it can be established that a substantial or operative purpose of the Carrier was to 
lessen competition in the cluster market for mobile phones and services, or the market 
for mobile telephony services, by preventing iPhone purchasers from using the services 
of the Carrier’s competitors, the Carrier will have engaged in exclusive dealing within 
the meaning of s 47(2), which is prohibited by s 47(1). 
 
D Exception for the licensing of intellectual property – s 51(3) 
 
Intellectual property laws are pro-competitive because they provide protection for and 
certainty of investment, and avoid problems associated with free-riding on intellectual 
property developed by others.  Accordingly, s 51(3) of the Trade Practices Act 1974 
(Cth)provides a statutory exemption from most provisions of Part IV of the Trade 
Practices Act 1974 (Cth),96 for certain conditions in licences or assignments of certain 
IP rights, including copyright.  Section 51(3) provides in relevant part: 
 
(3) A contravention of a provision of this Part other than section 46, 46A or 48 shall 
not be taken to have been committed by reason of: 
(a) the imposing of, or giving effect to, a condition of: 
(i) a licence granted by the proprietor, licensee or owner of … a copyright …; 
… 
to the extent that the condition relates to: [emphasis added] 
… 
(v) the work or other subject matter in which the copyright subsists; 
 
The scope of s 51(3) is uncertain because of ambiguity surrounding the ‘relates to’ 
requirement.97  Section 51(3) has been judicially considered in only one case, which 
involved a ‘best endeavours’ clause in a licence to use a patented process to construct 
electricity poles.98  In that case, while a majority of the High Court did not find it 
necessary to consider s 51(3), Mason and Wilson JJ held that the best endeavours clause 




                                                
94  Dowling v Dalgety Australia Ltd (1992) 34 FCR 109. 
95  Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) s 4F(1)(b).  
96  Sections 46 and 46A (misuse of market power) and 48 (retail price maintenance) of the Trade 
Practices Act 1974 (Cth) are unaffected by s 51(3). 
97  NCC, Review of Sections 51(2) and 51(3) of the Trade Practices Act 1974: Final Report (1999) 15-
23. 
98  Transfield Pty Ltd v Arlo International Ltd (1980) 144 CLR 83. 
99  Where the subject of the licence is a patent, the condition must ‘relate to … the invention to which 
the patent or application for a patent relates or articles made by the use of that invention’: Trade 
Practices Act 1974 (Cth) s 51(3)(a)(iii). 
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In his judgment, Mason J stated: 
 
In bridging the different policies of the Patents Act and the Trade Practices Act, s 51(3) 
recognizes that a patentee is justly entitled to impose conditions on the granting of a 
licence or assignment of a patent in order to protect the patentee’s legal monopoly. … 
Section 51(3) determines the scope of restrictions the patentee may properly impose on 
the use of the patent. Conditions which seek to gain advantages collateral to the patent are 
not covered by s 51(3).100
 
The proper scope of ‘relates to’ within s 51(3) is still a matter of some controversy.  
Section 51(3) was reviewed by the National Competition Council (‘NCC’) in 1999,101  
and the review identified a range of alternative views on the meaning of the term.102
 
If we accept the statement of Mason J that s 51(3) permits an intellectual property 
owner to impose licensing conditions to protect the intellectual property owner’s legal 
monopoly, do the conditions imposed by Apple Inc. meet that test?  The ‘legal 
monopoly’ of a copyright holder is the exclusive rights created by the Copyright Act 
1968 (Cth).  In the case of computer software,103 those rights are set out in s 31(1) of the 
Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) and include the exclusive right to reproduce the software in 
material form. 
 
Significantly, the right to control the use of computer software is not an exclusive right 
of the copyright owner, nor is the right to control the use of a device in which the 
software is embodied. 
 
It seems likely in those circumstances that an attempt by Apple Inc. to control which 
mobile carrier the iPhones can be used with would be an attempt to seek a collateral 
advantage to their copyright, and would not be protected by s 51(3).  The Carrier could 
not rely on s 51(3), as they are not the licensee of any relevant intellectual property. 
 
1 Commentary on s 51(3) 
 
Section 51(3) has never been judicially considered as it applies to copyright.  Professor 
Ricketson has argued that flaws in the drafting of s 51(3) render it ‘virtually 
meaningless’ as it applies to copyright.104  Such a literal construction of s 51(3) has 
been criticised,105 but the vagueness of the ‘relates to’ requirement has left the scope of 
s 51(3) uncertain. 
 
                                                
100  Transfield Pty Ltd v Arlo International Ltd (1980) 144 CLR 83, 102-3. 
101  NCC, above n 97, 186. 
102  Ibid 184; see also Clapperton and Corones, above n 2, 709. 
103  Computer software is protected as a literary work: Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 10. 
104  Section 51(3)(a)(v) requires that the conditions must ‘relate to … the work or other subject matter in 
which the copyright subsists.’  Copyright does not subsist in reproductions or copies, but only in the 
works or other subject matter in their first material form.  Ricketson suggests that s 51(3) would 
therefore be inapplicable to conditions relating to subsequent copies of the work: S Ricketson and C 
Creswell, The Law of Intellectual Property: Copyright, Designs and Confidential Information 
(Lawbook Co, vol 2) 24, [15.190]. 
105  Trade Practices Commission, Application of the Trade Practices Act to Intellectual Property (1991) 
12. 
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In 2000, the Intellectual Property and Competition Review Committee (‘IPCRC’) 
considered the recommendations of the NCC review, and stated that: 
 
there are flaws in the drafting of s 51(3) that under any scenario would require 
amendment. Leaving aside drafting considerations, the Committee believes that the 
uncertainty surrounding the scope of the section, and the possibility that it may exempt 
virtually all agreements which touch on IP from relevant sections of the Trade Practices 
Act, make the current section inappropriate. 
 
In 2001, the Government accepted the recommendations of the IPCRC in part, and 
announced that it intended to overhaul s 51(3), with the effect that intellectual property 
licensing would be subject to more provisions of Part IV than is currently the case.106  
Yet, more than six years later, the legislation to give effect to this announcement has not 
been introduced into Parliament, and s 51(3) remains unchanged, in generally the same 
terms as it stood in 1977.107
 
Times, technology, and markets have changed greatly since the 1970s, as has 
intellectual property.  Computers as we know them today did not exist when the Trade 
Practices Act 1974 (Cth) was introduced.  The computer software that existed in the 
1970s was not protected by copyright; copyright has only subsisted in computer 
software since 1984 amendments to the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth).108
 
The licensing and assignment of intellectual property in the 1970s was, generally, an 
exercise between businesses.  In modern times, computers of some description have 
found their way into many consumer goods and every-day items of commerce, 
including things such as mobile phones, electronic fuel injection systems in motor 
vehicles, and even garage door openers.  All of these computers run software which is 
protected by copyright. 
 
This means that the actual licensing of intellectual property now reaches down the 
supply chain as far as the consumer.  Sophisticated modern technology also allows the 
technological imposition of prima facie anti-competitive restraints on consumers. 
 
In much the same way as Apple Inc. can design an iPhone which will only work with 
AT&T, it could be possible for General Motors Holden to produce a car whose 
software-driven fuel injection system would only allow the car to run on Shell petrol.  It 
would be absurd to allow third-line forcing of petrol in a modern car, because the third-
line forcing was enforced by copyright software, but disallow third-line forcing of petrol 
in an older car, without fuel injection.  Third-line forcing in relation to consumer goods 
should not get a ‘free pass’ from Australia’s competition laws simply because the 
                                                
106  Australian Government, Government Response to Intellectual Property and Competition Review 
Recommendations (2001) 12 <http://www.ipaustralia.gov.au/pdfs/general/response1.PDF>.  For a 
consideration of the current s 51(3) and the likely impact of the changes proposed by the IPCRC see: 
I Eagles and L Longdin, ‘Competition in Information and Computer Technology Markets: 
Intellectual Property Licensing and Section 51(3) of the Trade Practices Act 1974’ (2003) 3 
Queensland University of Technology Law and Justice Journal 28. 
107  Except for minor changes, s 51(3) has not been amended since the Trade Practices Amendment Act 
1977 (Cth). 
108  Copyright Amendment Act 1984 (Cth) s 3. 
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supplier imposes its anti-competitive restraint by means of copyright software, rather 
than a condition of a contract.109
 
In a time where the anti-competitive use of computer software and other modern 
technology seems to be on the rise, s 51(3) is in need of a major overhaul to ensure it 




The Federal Court can grant an injunction in such terms as the Court determines to be 
appropriate, where a person is engaging or proposing to engage in conduct that 
constitutes or would constitute a contravention or attempted contravention of any of the 
provisions of Part IV described above.110  Such an injunction may be sought by any 
person,111 but as a practical matter is only likely to be sought by the ACCC or by a 
competitor of the Carrier.  The ACCC may also seek the imposition of a pecuniary 
penalty on Apple Inc. and/or the Carrier.112
 
The ACCC has additional powers to deal with allegedly anti-competitive conduct 
engaged in by the Carrier, under Part XIB of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth).113  
The markets we discuss above would all be telecommunications markets within the 
meaning of s 151AF of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth), because they involve the 
supply or acquisition of carriage services,114 or goods for use in connection with a 
carriage service.  Our analysis above suggests that the Carrier may contravene ss 45(2) 
and 47(2) of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth), which, because the contravening 
conduct relates to a telecommunications market, would constitute ‘anti-competitive 
conduct’ within the meaning of s 151AJ(3) of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth). 
 
If the ACCC has reason to believe that the Carrier is engaging in such anti-competitive 
conduct, the ACCC may issue the Carrier with a ‘Part A competition notice’,115 which 
has the effect of exposing the Carrier to significant pecuniary penalties if they continue 
such conduct while the notice is in force.  The ACCC may also issue the carrier with a 
‘Part B competition notice’,116 which would provide considerable assistance to any 
competitor of the Carrier wishing to litigate the contravention, as the Part B competition 





                                                
109  See Eagles and Longdin, above n 106, 43-4. 
110  Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) s 80(1)(a)(i). 
111  Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) s 80(1). 
112  Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) ss 76, 77. 
113  See generally Corones, above n 48, Ch 13 
114  Mobile telephony services are a ‘carriage service’ within the meaning of the Telecommunications Act 
1997 (Cth). 
115  Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) s 151AKA. 
116  Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) s 151AL. 
117  Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) s 151AN(1).  We concede that the issuing of a Part B competition 
notice for this type of behavior would be unprecedented, the ACCC having never issued a Part B 
competition notice, even in cases of much more serious anti-competitive behavior. 
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V CONCLUSION 
 
While DRM and other forms of technological ‘locks’ may have substantial pro-
competitive benefits, where they are used to prevent the infringement of copyright, such 
technology can be used to achieve anti-competitive ends.  Thus far, the anti-competitive 
abuses of DRM have mainly involved locking in consumers, and locking out 
competitors.  It is probably too soon to conclude whether Australia’s competition laws 
are adequate to deal with anti-competitive abuses of DRM.118
 
The Apple Inc. iPhone represents a significant change in this type behaviour – for the 
first time, a manufacturer is using DRM and technological ‘locks’ to force the use of 
goods or services other than their own. 
 
On the available evidence, Apple Inc.’s behaviour has no pro-competitive justification, 
and serves merely to extract monopoly rents from customers who are compelled to use 
AT&T’s services.  The pending antitrust actions against Apple Inc. in the US will test 
the legality of its conduct in that country, with the battle likely to be framed in terms of 
Apple Inc.’s freedom to innovate and market its products as it sees fit, versus the rights 
of the consumer to choose their own service provider at a cheaper price. 
 
Our analysis of Apple Inc.’s potential future conduct under Australia’s competition laws 
demonstrates that it may be unlawful.  Australia’s competition laws may be uniquely 
suited to preventing this type of anti-competitive technological tying – because they 
prohibit third-line forcing per se, they greatly simplify the task of seeking redress for 
this behaviour through the courts. In addition, the Notice Procedure under Part XIB of 
the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) may facilitate enforcement by the ACCC. 
 
Time will tell whether we have entered a new age of anti-competitive use of technology, 
and whether current competition laws in Australia and elsewhere are up to the task of 
preventing it. 
                                                
118  Clapperton and Corones, above n 2. 
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